Self-consciousness and the self -- Diachronic unity, diachronic singularity, and the subject of consciousness -- A modal argument for immateriality -- Intelligibility concerns and causal objections -- Concluding remarks.

My primary aim in this paper is to show that the structure of experience must include a subject (or self). I argue that the subjectless (No-Self) views of our experience must be rejected, primarily because without the consciousness-unifying function of a subject they are unable to account for the unities of consciousness present in our experience. In addition, I contend that such views fail in another respect. They emphasize the streaming of experience, the ever-changing flow of conscious events, but have (...) difficulty identifying what must stand unmoving to provide the contrast needed for the experience of motion. (shrink)

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A good case can be made for the claim that most recent studies in the philosophy of mind are marred by a failure to attribute sufficient importance to what is revealed from the first person perspective. When that perspective is ignored or neglected, a number of problems concerning the nature of self and consciousness arise, or become more difficult to resolve. One such problem is that of whether we can conceive of disembodied existence, i.e., of a self continuing to exist (...) after the death of the physical body. (shrink)